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An important problem with which the Maryland Court
of Appeals may soon have to deal is the extent to which
a majority of the stockholders of a business corporation
will be permitted to alter or destroy the rights of preferred
stockholders to past accrued but unpaid dividends. The
importance of this question lies in the fact that, in times
of business expansion following a general depression,
many corporations find an obstacle to successful refinancing in the existence of a contingent liability for dividend arrearages in their financial structures.' The ability
of majority stockholders legally to fund this obligation,
and so to postpone its payment depends fundamentally
upon statutory construction and policy with regard to the
powers of those in effective control of a corporation. The
seriousness of this problem is enhanced by the relatively
large number of corporations organized under the Maryland statutes.
Two general methods of accomplishing such a funding
of the arrearages suggest themselves. The charter of incorporation may be amended, either substituting new
shares of a similar preferred stock in value2 equivalent to
the value of the old preferred shares with their accrued
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., Princeton University, 1937; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1940.
1 On Oct. 15, 1940, 117 of the 348 cumulative issues (of a total of 396) of
domestic preferred stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were in
arrears in an aggregate amount exceeding one billion dollars. Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 22, 1940.
2 The value selected might be par, stated, book, or liquidation value; the
rates of return, participation, preemption rights, and other features wou]d
also enter into the calculation.
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dividends, or creating a new class of prior preferred stock
offered in exchange for the old stock with its accrued dividends at a ratio equalizing the value of the new with that
of the old plus the latter's dividend arrears.' The old
corporation may be merged or consolidated into, or all of
its assets sold as an entirety to, a second corporation
(either pre-existing or created for the purpose) with provisions for compelling preferred stockholders to surrender
their old shares with the accrued dividends thereon for an
equivalent value in securities of the second corporation.
The problem is whether, regardless of their economic
power or rights to require the corporation to buy them
out, a dissenting bloc of the preferred stockholders, say
ten per cent, could effectually prevent the funding of the
accrued dividends on their shares by such methods. In
view of the age of many Maryland charters, it is also
necessary to consider whether the minority stockholders'
rights would be any different if, for example, the corporation had been organized in 1900 instead of sometime during
the last two decades.
CONSTRUCTIONAL ISSUES

Article 23, Section 22 of the Maryland Code of 1939,
after providing that every stockholder in a Maryland corporation shall have one vote per share unless otherwise
stipulated by the charter, further provides:
"Notwithstanding any provision of law requiring
any action to be taken or authorized by the affirmative
vote of the holders of a majority or other designated
proportion of the shares or of the shares of each class,
* . ., or to be otherwise taken or authorized by vote
of the stockholders or members of any corporation,
such action shall be effective and valid if taken or
authorized by such vote of its stockholders or members as may be required for such action by its charter;
but in the case of corporations having capital stock,
the requisite number of affirmative votes shall not in
any case be less than a majority in number of the agIn either case, of course, the new stock would have no dividend arrearages.
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gregate number of votes to which the holders of
the shares (meaning thereby all of the shares of
classes in the aggregate) outstanding and entitled
vote thereon, shall be entitled, except in cases
which the law authorizes such action to be taken
authorized by a less vote . . ."

all
all
to
in
or
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In the absence of a charter provision specifically referring
to the authorization of any of the suggested acts, the
corporation must conform to other provisions of the law
touching on the particular action contemplated. How
general or broadly phrased a charter reservation would be
sufficient legal basis for the acts proposed, depends primarily on the general attitude the Court of Appeals would
take as to the constitutional scope of such a provision, and
discussion thereof will be deferred for consideration along
with other matters of policy.
(A)

CharterAmendment

Amending the charter so as to eliminate the dividends
which have accrued on preferred stock involves two types
of statutory provision. In the first place, statutory authorization must be found for the particular method employed
in the amendment whereby the preferred stockholders'
dividend arrearages are to be destroyed. Secondly, statutory authorization must be found for destroying the rights
of preferred stockholders to dividend arrearages by the
device of charter amendment.
As to the first, Section 28 of Article 23 is very broad
in the scope of permissible charter amendments, including
as legitimate objects of amendment not only increasing,
decreasing, classifying or reclassifying all or any part of
the capital stock, but also "the making of any other amendment of the charter that may be desired". Section 29 requires for the validity of an amendment the affirmative
vote of the holders of two-thirds of all the shares (or, if
two or more classes have been previously issued, twothirds of each class) outstanding and entitled to vote.4
4 Of course this required proportion might be reduced by means of a
proper charter reservation as contemplated by Section 22.
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Thus far an amendment authorized by the vote of the
holders of all the voting stock except a small block of preferred, providing for substitution of new preferred shares
with an equalizing value and rate of return for old preferred shares, or providing for issue of a new class of
preferred stock with an equivalent value and rate of return
but having priority over the old preferred stock, would be
well within the scope of amendments permissible under
Section 28 and the required authorization thereof by a twothirds majority of each voting class of stock under Section 29.
Each of these amendments would, however, further
involve the destruction of the right of the old preferred
stockholders to accrued dividends. In the one case this
is accomplished by substitution of a certain number of
shares of new stock for each share of old preferred stock
and its accrued dividends, the old class being abolished.
In the other case the old preferred shareholder loses his
priority rights unless he accepts the offer to exchange his
old shares with their accrued dividends for new prior preferred shares, in which case he has again been parted
from his right to accrued dividends, though not quite in
such a direct manner.
The fundamental question is whether an amendment
which has the effect of destroying the right of preferred
stockholders to accrued but unpaid dividends is within
the permissible scope of amendments. Even if the amendment seeks to accomplish a legitimate purpose, however,
it would be invalid unless authorized by the proportion
of shareholders required for this sort of an amendment;
this raises a preliminary question. Besides the affirmative vote of two-thirds of each class required by Section
29 for all amendments, there are certain additional limitations imposed on the amending power by the latter part of
Section 28, which provides:
"... No amendment of the charter of a corporation shall be valid which changes the terms of any of
the outstanding stock by classification, reclassification,
or otherwise, in the absence of a reservation in the
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charter of a right to make such amendment, unless
such change in the terms thereof shall have been
authorized by the holders of all of such stock at the
time outstanding, by vote at a meeting or in writing
with or without a meeting; . . . The words 'terms'
as used in this section in reference to stock is intended to mean only the contract rights of the holders
thereof as expressed in the charter and shall be so
construed." (Italics supplied.)
It seems clear on both principle and authority that an
amendment which has the effect of taking away the preferred stockholders' rights to accrued dividends is one
changing the "contract rights" of the holders of outstanding stock. How else does the right to accrued dividends
arise if not by virtue of the terms of the contract entered
into when the preferred shareholder bought his stock?
That contract defined the returns to which he was to be
entitled on his investment as "cumulative"; his right vests
as against junior security-holders by the mere lapse of
time, whether or not a surplus was earned out of which
the dividends could be paid, this latter contingency conditioning only the assertability of the right as against the
corporation. 5 In McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co.,6
the United States District Court for Maryland, speaking
through Judge Coleman, expressly stated that this right to
accrued dividends was such a preferred contractual right
as to come within the terms of Section 28. Hence, dissent
by only a single preferred shareholder would render ineffective any amendment seeking to destroy or change this
right unless there were a reservation in the charter of
power to make such an amendment. There seems little
doubt but that a proper reservation in the charter would
preclude the necessity for unanimous consent, in view of
" See: Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A.
696 (Ct. of Chancery, 1923) ; Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 155 A. 514 (Supreme Ct., 1931); General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 A. 244
(Ct. of Errors & Appeals, 1925).
'27 F. Supp. 639, 646 (D. Md., 1939), noted (1939) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev.
114; procedural questions disposed of in 13 F. Supp. 53 (D. Md., 1935);
and 22 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md., 1938) ; aff'd 112 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th,
1940) ; cert. den. 311 U. S. - 85 L. Ed. 280, 61 S. Ct. 316 (1940) ; discussed
fully infra circa n. 10,
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the terminology of Section 28; indeed a charter provision
might even eliminate the necessity for any vote on the
part of the affected stock other than what it may be entitled to with respect to any ordinary amendment.7 And
Judge Coleman in McQuillen v. National Cash Register
Co.' treated the charter reservation provision of the section as affording the corporation an alternative to unani-

mous consent to just such an amendment.

How specific

the charter reservation would have to be raises a distinct
question the answer to which will depend primarily on the
general broad constructional and constitutional policies of
the Court, there being no Maryland cases sufficiently near
the point; probably the Court will require that it be

reasonably specific.9
See Note (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 254, 258.
Supra., n. 6.
It seems reasonably certain, at least, that a mere general reservation
in the charter of power in a designated proportion of stockholders "to do
any corporate act not otherwise inconsistent with charter or statutory
provisions" would not be specific enough. Such a reservation would be
broad enough to take advantage of Section 22, but that opportunity was
created by the legislature in Md. Laws 1922, Ch. 309, Sec. 3, Subs. 17, after
the limitation on the amending power contained in Section 28 had been
imposed with an express provision for a nullifying charter reservation
by Md. Laws 1920, Ch. 545, Sec. 8A, and at the same time that the definition of the words "terms" was added to Section 28 by Md. Laws 1922.
Ch. 309, Sec. 3, Subs. 24. This fact would indicate that the legislature
did not intend that a general reservation taking advantage of Section 22
would be sufficient to bring into operation the saving clause of Section 28
with respect to amendments changing the terms of outstanding stock.
A reservation in the charter of power in a designated proportion of
stockholders to "make any amendment authorized by law, including amendments changing the terms of outstanding stock" would seem specific
enough to invoke the saving clause of Section 28: but on the other hand.
the Court might feel it so disfranchising to minority stockholders as to
require equitable or constitutional limitation.
Some doubt may be expressed as to whether a charter provision reserving the right in a designated proportion of shareholders to alter the
"preferences" of outstanding stock by amendment, would be satisfactory.
It is submitted that the average layman in the financial community.
whose interpretation of charter and stock certificate provisions is entitled
to some weight, considers the word "preferences" more as referring to the
relative priorities (such as right to share in profits, voting powers, preemption rights, conversion privileges and distribution of assets in dissolution) of his security as against other securities in the same corporation
than as referring to a matured right to accrued dividends. That is, a
"preference" means to a practical business man an existing privilege which
may give rise to a future right, rather than a presently existing claimexisting but not assertable. of course, until earnings are sufficient to warrent payment by the corporation. See: Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller,
166 Md. 590. 171 A. 842 (1934). The Delaware Court of Chancery has
taken just this stand, with regard to a statute authorizing amendments
altering the "preferences" of outstanding stock (29 Del. Laws. Ch. 113,
See. 26). After ruling in Peters v. T". S. Mortgage Co.. 13 Del. Ch. 11.
s
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However, assuming that by means of some proper
charter reservation the preliminary requisite of proper
authorization by stockholders for such an amendment has
been complied with, there is yet to be faced the fundamental problem of whether the Court of Appeals will consider the destruction of accrued dividends within the permissible scope of the amending power. Section 28, after
listing a number of relatively specific purposes for which
amendments may be made, further authorizes:
"... the making of any other amendment of the
charter that may be desired, provided that such
amendment shall contain only such provisions as it
would have been lawful or proper to insert in an original certificate of incorporation made at the time of
making such amendment . . ."
Although the Court of Appeals has not yet been presented with the problem, the ground is not completely unbroken in Maryland, for the question has been examined
in the light of the relevant Maryland statutes and definitely ruled upon by the United States District Court for
Maryland in the McQuillen case, above referred to.' ° In
that case the defendant corporation, organized in Maryland in 1926, had outstanding on December 15, 1932, a
capital stock issue consisting of 1,190,000 shares of Class A
$3 cumulative participating preferred and 400,000 shares
of Class B non-cumulative participating preferred, each
class being of the no-par variety. At that time there were
dividend arrearages on the Class A stock of $5,801,250, no
dividends having been paid since 1931. To relieve the
corporation of this obstacle to refinancing and expansion,
a recapitalization plan was proposed and the charter
amendment providing therefor passed by the two-thirds
114 A. 598 (Ct. of Chancery, 1921) that the right of a preferred stockholder to future priority in payment of dividends was no more than such
a "preference" as could be destroyed by amendment, the Chancellor in
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (Ct.
of Chancery, 1923) held that accumulated dividend arrearages were a
present "property right", postponable in enjoyment, but nevertheless assertable upon the happening of the proper contingency and "vested" as
against the other stockholders, and that therefore it was more than
a mere "preference" and could not be destroyed by amendment.
20 Supra, n. 6.
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majority required by Article 7 of the charter for creation
of new issues of stock and the making of other amendments." By means of a stock split-up and conversion all
accrued dividends were to be eliminated.1 2 On this ground,
two years after the amendment had taken effect, the plaintiff, who had bought 100 shares of Class A stock in 1928
and 1929, brought a bill praying an injunction against the
carrying out of the plan embodied in the amendment. The
District Court dismissed the bill, ruling that Section 28
of the Maryland Code was broad enough to permit destruction of the right of preferred stockholders to accrued
dividends by a charter amendment passed by the vote of
the holder of two-thirds of the aggregate shares of all
classes outstanding, where the charter reserved the power
in such proportion to do any act requiring authorization
by the stockholders. It was held that Articles 7 and 11
of the charter invoked the saving clause of Section 28 by
taking advantage of the terms of Section 22.13 The Court
stated that decisions in Delaware, New York and New
Jersey favorable to dissenting stockholders in similar circumstances were in no way controlling because the statutes there involved were not so broad as the Maryland
amendments statute. Proceeding to analyze the statute,
the Court held that an amendment destructive of the rights
of preferred stockholders to dividend arrearages was
clearly such a provision as might have been inserted in the
n Although the Secretary of the corporation reported that the amendment had been authorized by two-thirds of the stockholders of each class.
whereas in fact it had been authorized by two-thirds of the aggregate of
stockholders of both classes considered as a single class, this was held
neither to be a badge of fraud nor to invalidate the amendment, since
Article 7 of the charter, by taking advantage of Section 22, eliminated
the necessity for strict compliance with Section 28 requiring two-thirds of
each class. McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 112 F. (2d) 877, 883.
11 The amendment provided for increasing the authorized issue of Class
A stock by 238,000 shares which were to be distributed in a split-up to old
Class A holders as a stock dividend of 20%. It further called for the
creation of a new Class C stock with dividend and voting rights equivalent
to those on Class A. authorized in the amount of 200,000 shares without
par value, which were to be exchanged for the 400,000 shares of Class B
stock. After this exchange was completed, all Class A and Class C stock
were to become a new single class of common stock without fixed or
cumulative dividends.
13 See supra, n. 9. Section 22 of Article 2.9 of the present Code of 193.!)
(Flack) was, at the time of the McQuillen decision, Section 23 of the same
article in the Code of 1924 (Bagby).
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original charter, and that the statute expressly authorized
any amendment "which changes the terms of any of the
outstanding stock by classification, reclassification, or
otherwise". Since the words "terms" was expressly defined to mean "contractual rights", it was ruled that the
right to accrued dividends, being unquestionably of such
a nature, was therefore subject to being altered by a
proper amendment. The unanimous consent required by
the statute for such amendment was held to be unnecessary since there was sufficient charter reservation to invoke the saving clause providing an alternative to unanimous consent. The rest of the District Court's opinion
dealt with the validity of a stock-purchase option given to
a director, a question not pertinent here. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court on both questions, 4 but it added nothing material to the present discussion, doing little more than to
adopt Judge Coleman's views.
As persuasive authority on interpretation of the Maryland law, the McQuillen opinion perhaps leaves something
to be desired. Although the District Court expressly
rested its decision on statutory construction and dismissed
the question of the plaintiff's laches as being therefore unnecessary of determination, it is suggested that the facts
that the action was not brought until two years after the
amendment was passed, and that the recapitalization had
been going on for almost six years before the final opinion
was handed down, carried no small weight in influencing
the Court to refuse to upset the amendment and attempt
to undo all that had been done, merely in order to protect
the (alleged) rights of a far from alert holder of less than
1% of the oustanding preferred stock.
In such a view of the facts, the decision can only be regarded as eminently fair; but from the purely technical
constructional viewpoint, its reasoning is not entirely compelling, for the opinion deals only with the literal terms
of the statute and fails to consider the probable intent of
14 112 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); cert. don. 311 U. S. -,
280, 61 S. Ct. 316 (1940).

85 L. Ed.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. V

the Legislature as to the scope thereof. The decision appears to assume that the provision of Section 28 limiting
the power of less than a majority to make an amendment
altering the contract rights of stockholders, combined with
the saving clause, contains affirmative permission to make
an amendment destroying the right to accrued dividends.
There seems room for doubt whether the Legislature intended "contract rights" to include rights which have been
described by other courts as "vested", 15 "property rights","
17
"in the nature of a debt".
It would seem quite possible for the Court of Appeals
to consider an amendment destroying rights to accrued
dividends as being so fundamental in nature as to require
unanimous consent entirely aside from the statute; for the
statute permitting charter amendments merely restricts
the common law rule and is capable of being held not applicable-the statute clearly does not go so far as to abrogate completely the common law rule requiring unanimity
of stockholder consent to any amendment. Beyond this,
such an amendment might be open to question on the score
of the legality or propriety of such a provision in the original charter18-it could hardly be argued that permission
to alter the contract rights of outstanding stock so far
limits the proviso in regard to legality or propriety as to
authorize an amendment deemed to be otherwise illegal or
improper. Finally, it is far from clear that a charter reservation generally worded and primarily if not solely intended to take advantage of Section 22, could or should be
held to invoke the saving clause of Section 28 with respect
to amendments changing the terms of outstanding stock."
15 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696
(Ct. of Chancery, 1923) ; Keller v. Wilson, 190 A. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct.,
1936); Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906
(1939).
16 Ibid.
7
" Boardman v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 84 N. Y. 157
(1881); Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 A. 657 (Ct. of
Chancery, 1907); Schneider v. Foster-Thornburg Hardware Co., 33 F.
Supp. 271 (S. D. W. Va., 1940).
18 Required by the proviso in the first sentence of Section 28.
11 See supra, n. 9.
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Since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins" and its complementary
decisions, final authority on matters of local law rests
solely with the state courts.2 Hence the Maryland courts
are free to decline the lead offered by the McQuillen case
and to examine the state of the authorities in other jurisdictions before ruling on the validity of amendments which
in one way or another effectually destroy the right of preferred stockholders to accrued unpaid dividends.
Deserving of particular consideration is the judicial
opinion prevailing in Delaware, not only because of the
generally similar liberality of the Delaware General Corporation Law to the Maryland law, but also because of the
frequency with which the Delaware courts have had to
deal with this problem.
In the first case on the subject in Delaware, Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co.,2 2 the Chancellor decreed
void that part of a charter amendment which provided for
cancellation of accrued dividends of 24% on the outstanding preferred stock, on the ground that the dividend arrearages constituted a "vested right" in the nature of a
property right, which could not be destroyed by amendment although the applicable statute permitted amendments altering the "preferences" of stock outstanding. In
1927 this statute was amended by the Legislature 23 to permit alteration by self-amendment of "other special rights
of the shares" as well. In Keller v. Wilson2 4 the Chancellor held that this amendment to the statute was intended to abrogate the result of the Morris case, and he
therefore refused to declare void an amendment substituting 5 shares of common stock for each old share of
Class A (cumulative preferred) stock and cancelling accrued dividends thereon of $21.25. On appeal, however,
he was reversed by the Supreme Court,2 5 which adopted
"0304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
" Destruction of accrued dividends under the Bankruptcy Act, especially
Chapter 10, is beyond the scope of this article. See, in -this connection,
In re Community Power & Light Co., 33 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y., 1940),
involving a Delaware corporation.
'14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (Ct. of Chancery, 1923).
2238 Del. Laws, Ch. 94, Sec. 3.
"180 A. 584 (Del. Ct. of Chancery, 1935).
22 190 A. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1936).
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the "vested right" theory promulgated in the Morris case,
and held that the statute as amended was not broad enough
to authorize a charter amendment destroying the rights
of preferred stockholders to dividend arrearages. In the
belief that the Court had been concerned in its opinion
more with the scope of the reserved power of the state
by amendment of the General Corporation Law to increase
the charter rights of majority stockholders in a corporation organized in 1925, the scope and applicability of that
1927 amendment was tested with regard to a corporation
organized in 1928 after the 1927 amendment had taken
effect. Disregarding this difference in facts, the Supreme
26
Court held in Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson
that the Chancellor, in decreeing a charter amendment
destructive of dividend arrears27 to be null and void and
permanently enjoining the carrying it into effect, had correctly construed the implications of the decision in Keller
v. Wilson with respect to the scope of the 1927 amendment.28
In view of the definity of the stand of the Delaware
courts, it might be well to examine in more detail the
"vested rights" theory as first promulgated in the Morris
case and more particularly as elaborated in Keller v.
Wilson. The fundamental concept of the theory is the
effect of lapse of time upon the terms of the cumulative
preferred stock contract. This contract provides in essence that the holder of preferred shares is to receive a
fixed yearly dividend, in priority to junior security
holders, and if the earnings of the corporation in any year
21194 A. 844 (Del. Ct. of Chancery, 1937); 197 A. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct.,
1937). Contra: Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C.
A. 2d. 1933) ; cert. den. 290 U. S. 673, 78 L. Ed. 581, 54 S. Ct. 92 (1933).
27 The amendment proposed to convert 4 shares of old $2 cumulative
participating preferred stock with their $4 per share accrued dividends
into 5 shares of new $1 cumulative participating preferred and 1 share of
new common stock.
28 But see: Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 Atl. (2d) 331 (Del.
Sup. Ct., 1940), where the Court summarily disposed of Keller v. Wilson
as being purely and simply a decision on the reserved power of the state,
and where Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson was considered totally
inapplicable because it involved the amendments statute whereas the case
at bar involved the merger statute. The logic in distinguishing two very
similar cases on entirely different grounds is difficult to perceive.
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are not sufficient to justify the payment of any dividends
on the preferred, payment thereof may be postponed, but
the fixed dividend will nevertheless accrue. Each year
dividends are passed, they accumulate, and when earnings
increase, no dividend may be paid on junior securities
until all the past accumulated dividends on the preferred
stock are paid off. The preferred stockholder's right has
become "vested" as against the holders of junior securities, who agreed when they bought their interests in, and
made their contracts with, the corporation that the preferred stockholders were to have this right. Clearly this
is a substantial right of the preferred shareholders, which
gives value to his stock and on which he relies in keeping
his investment, particularly in years when dividends are
passed. If this right were subject to being cut off by the
action of a majority of stockholders who felt that its destruction would benefit the corporation financially, it
would be merely an illusory right in the hands of the dissentient stockholder, for the value of his investment could
be violently diminished without his consent. In effect he
is being deprived of at least a substantial part of a valuable property right-viz., his part-ownership of the business-for if his investment turns out to be non-productive,
he has become an unfortunate speculator against his will,
whereas he acquired his interest on the understanding
that he would receive a fixed return thereon regardless
of all contingencies except ultimate insolvency. 29 Now,
however, he finds himself entitled to a fixed return on his
investment only if the majority (or whatever other proportion is required) of the stockholders think it wise business policy to give it to him. For the directors can in
their discretion let dividend arrearages pile up during the
lean years, and then the majority stockholders can ratify
this policy and carry it to the length of completely wiping
out the accrued rights which induced the preferred shareholder originally to invest and then to retain his interest
21 See: Comment, Preferred Stock as an Investment Security (1939) 28
Georgetown L. J. 232-258.
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in the corporate enterprise.A0 The fact that this might be
the best business expedient in the circumstances is an
argument which might be used by the majority in attempting to persuade the dissenters to sacrifice their rights, but
it does not afford a valid basis for refusal by a court to
protect the minority from destruction of their property
rights against their will.3 1
While the state undoubtedly has from the public policy
viewpoint an interest in the corporate welfare, e. g., in permitting necessary refinancing, nevertheless it must exercise all its powers with regard for the rights of all concerned. 2 The state also has an interest in the protection
of the investing public, and this involves protection against
the destruction of such substantial rights as those of preferred stockholders to dividends which have accrued but
are as yet unpaid.
Apparently Delaware has begun to retreat from its original position, one protecting accrued dividends against all
form of encroachment, for in two cases decided last year
this right was suffered to be effectually destroyed, in one
instance by merger3 3 and in the other by charter amendment. In the latter case, Shanik v. White Sewing Machine
Corp.,3 the complaining preference stockholder was refused an injunction against payment of dividends on prior
preference stock issued in accordance with a charter
amendment providing for a plan of recapitalization intended to wipe out a deficit of $3,167,228.26. Under this
amendment there were to be a reduction of stated capital,
a reverse split of the common stock, 5 shares for 2, and the
old preference stock was to be left untouched but could
be exchanged for one share of the new prior preference
stock and three shares of common. Of course the old
1oThe increased voting rights which normally accrue to the preferred
stockholders on the passing of dividends are usually so circumscribed
as to interfere but little with the effective control in the bands of the
common shareholders.
'I Lonsdale v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 554,
139 A. 50 (Ct. of Chancery, 1927) ; discussed infra, circa n. 44.
a' Keller v. Wilson, 190 A. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1936).
38 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct.,
1940) ; discussed infra, circa n. 85.
34 15 A. (2d) 169 (Del. Ct. of Chancery, 1940).
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preference stockholder could retain his now junior securities with their $30 dividends arrearages, but the chance
of his ever realizing on the accrued dividends was practically eliminated. Nevertheless, the Vice Chancellor,
while paying his lip-service to the doctrine of the Morris
and Keller and ConsolidatedFilm Industries cases, held the
recapitalization plan, amendment, and reduction of capital
to be legal and proper inasmuch as the preference stockholder could show no interference with his right to accrued
dividends, which he still retained.
Similar rulings have been made in Illinois" and Ohio.
In Johnson v. Lamprecht," the Ohio Court sustained an
amendment providing for issue of a new class of prior
preferred stock, 11/ shares of which, with / share (worth
$6) of common stock, could be acquired in exchange for
each share of old preferred stock with its $20 of accrued
dividends. Here again the preferred stockholder was
denied equitable relief on the ground that the plan was
not compulsory, the Court admitting that its validity would
have been questionable had it been compulsory. It is
submitted that in each of these cases the Court ignored
the obvious economic fact that "the exchange is in law
compulsory, if to refrain therefrom would result in an
obvious and substantial loss." 11
It is true that when a prior preferred stock is issued the
dissenter could keep his old stock as a junior security, to
which position he knew, by the terms of the charter and
applicable statutes it might be reduced by the vote of a
certain majority, when he bought his stock. It would seem,
however, that leaving the dissenting shareholder with a
practically worthless right to accrued dividends and expressly destroying that right are similar devices: the distinction is without a difference. Exactly this view has been
taken by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. In Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills Co. 8 an injunction was
Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N. E. (2d) 502 (1940).
Ohio St. 567, 15 N. V. (2d) 127 (1938).
"Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533, 537 (D. R.
I.. 1929).
as 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906 (1939).
'
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upheld against an amendment authorizing issue of prior
preferred shares, and so injuring preferred stockholders'
rights to accrued dividends, on the ground that a vested
right could not be so altered. Subsequently, in Patterson
v. Henrietta Mills, 9 the doctrine of the former case was
held applicable to an amendment providing for substitution
of new preferred stock for old, and terminating the right
to accrued dividends on the original stock. This seems
clearly the more realistic approach and consequently the
one more likely to be adopted by the Maryland courts
despite the similarity between the Delaware and Maryland statutes.
New Jersey has to some extent recognized the "vested
right" theory, and again any supposed distinction between
practical destruction of accrued dividends by issue of prior
preferred stock and avowed destruction has been ignored.
In Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co.," it was held that this
right fell within the language of the statute permitting
consolidation provided that "all debts, liabilities and
duties" of the consolidating corporation should attach to
the new or consolidated corporation, which was therefore
liable for accrued dividends on preferred stock of the
consolidating corporation before any property could be
distributed to the common stockholders under the consolidation agreement. In General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.,4 1 preferred stockholders sought
an injunction against an amendment authorizing purchase
and retirement of the outstanding preferred stock, cancellation of unissued preferred stock, and issue of a new
series of prior preferred stock, on the ground that it violated the vested rights of the preferred shareholders. The
majority of the Court held that (1) the amendment was
valid under a statute permitting a corporation to "create
one or more classes of preferred stock" at any time, even
though such an amendment might to some extent affect
the preferred stockholders' vested rights; but that (2)
so far as the amendment authorized the purchase and re"216 N. C. 728, 6 S. E. (2d) 531 (1940).
4073 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 A. 657 (Ct. of Obancery, 1907).
"98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 A. 244 (Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1925).
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tirement of the preferred stock with those accrued dividends unpaid and remaining in the treasury which were
allocable to the shares of the dissenting preferred stockholders, it was invalid. It is not clear whether in referring
to vested rights, the majority meant that accrued dividends
could thus be cut off by amendment or not.
Much clearer is a concurring opinion,4 2 cited with approval by the Delaware Court,4 3 in which it was suggested
that the amendment authorizing the issue of prior preferred stock does not invade any vested rights of holders
of outstanding preferred stock as to priorities in future
dividends and on dissolution, for their contracts were subject to such alteration by amendment. It was further
stated, however, that if the amendment sought to destroy
the unpaid accrued dividends of 140% on the preferred
stock which were covered to the extent of two-fifths by
existing surplus, to this extent the amendment would be
invalid as invading a vested contract right on the basis of
which the preferred stockholders had invested their money;
but that in fact the plan did not accomplish this because
as to these accrued dividends the dissenting preferred
stockholders still had preference over the new prior preferred stock.
In Lonsdale v. International Mercantile Marine Co.,4 4
a permanent injunction was granted against a proposed
amendment whereby each old preferred share with $70
accrued dividends was to be cancelled in exchange for
5 shares of new common stock. This was done on the
theory that the preferred stockholders had by the terms
of their contract and the passage of time become vested
with rights as against the common stockholders in the
corporate surplus of some $17,000,000. diversion of which
rights, as by the proposed amendment, would impair the
investment value of the outstanding preferred shares. The
consequent reduction of the value of their property rights,
it was held, could not legally be accomplished without the
consent of the- holders.
White, J., concurring; 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 332, 129 A. 244, 249.
Keller v. Wilson, 190 A. 115, 1234 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1936).
' 101 N. J. Eq. 554, 139 A. 50 (Ct. of Chancery, 1927).
42
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In Windhurst v. Central Leather Co.,4 5 a merger was
allowed whereby each old preferred share with 43% dividend arrearages was to be exchanged for certain stock
in the new corporation in addition to $5 in cash. The Vice
Chancellor held that the plan was not unfair or inequitable
to the preferred stockholders as it involved only a slight
reduction in the return on investment, and distinguished
the Lonsdale case as involving stockholders' rights in existing surplus, whereas the corporation in the case at bar
lhad a capital deficit of some $19,000,000. He further held,
though not as the controlling element in the case, that
the plaintiff stockholders were barred by laches, on which
ground he distinguished the Colgate case. The Court of
Errors and Appeals adopted the Vice Chancellor's opinion
in affirming his dismissal of the bill for injunction and
specific performance of the stock contract. None of the
opinions, however, mentioned the decision in General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., presumably
because the holding there was not so clear as might be
desired. New Jersey now has a statute,4 6 however, which
specifically allows the elimination of arrearages by charter
amendment upon the approval of two-thirds of the class
involved. This statute was passed shortly before the
Lonsdale decision and the first opinion in the Windhurst
case and evidently was considered inapplicable where the
charter of the corporation was in existence previously, for
it was cited in neither case; but it would clearly apply
when the charter was issued after the passage of the statute.4 7
It might be argued that the authority of some of the
foregoing cases is weakened by the fact that the corporation in question had an existing surplus at the time the attempt was made to destroy the rights of preferred stockholders to accrued dividends, and that consequently it was
easier for the Court to find that the preferred shareholders
11 101 N. J. Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (Ct. of Chancery, 1927); 105 N. J. Eq.
621, 149 A. 36 (Ct. Chancery, 1930) ; aff'd 107 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 A. 402 (Ct.
of Errors and Appeals, 1931).
'IN. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) Secs. 14: 11-1 to 11-3.
" See Sander v. Janssen Dairy Corp.. 3 F. Supp. 512 (D. N. J.. 1.940).
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had a present right therein which was inviolable, than it
would be in a case where no surplus existed. It was on this
ground that the Federal District Court in Rhode Island
in Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.4 8 distinguished
the General Investment Co. case, which was cited to it,
and refused to follow the reasoning of the concurring opinion in that case. In the Yoakam case, the Court was called
upon to determine the legality of an amendment to the
charter of a Delaware corporation which had been approved by the holders of 82% of the preferred stock and
provided (1) for the creation of new prior preferred Class
A and prior preferred Class B stock, (2) that the holders
of old preferred were to have the right to receive in exchange for each old share, one share each of new Class A,
new Class B, and common stock, this right to be conditioned
upon waiver of all rights to accrued and unpaid dividends,
(3) that the old preferred stock dividends were to be no
longer cumulative, and (4) that the sinking fund for the
old preferred stock was to be abolished. Only as to the
last provision did the Court hold this amendment invalid
under the laws of Delaware. It was held that there was
sufficient statutory authorization for the issue of new preferred stock having priority over the old preferred and
for the abolition of the cumulative feature of the latter
as to future dividends, on the theory that the amendment
was thereby merely altering the "preferences" of the outstanding stock, which was specificially permitted by the
Delaware amendments statute.
As to accrued dividends the Court interpreted the
amendment as having the effect of preserving all rights
of dissenting preferred stockholders in respect to earned
surplus then existing and available for dividend purposes,
but that it would be proper for the corporation to pay
from future earnings dividends on the new prior preferred
stock in advance of the payment in full of all accrued dividends on non-assenting preferred stock. This is the only
case found which has so definitely drawn a distinction
based on the existence vel non of a corporate surplus as
4834

F. (2d)

533 (D. R. I.. 1929).
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determinative of the question whether a destruction of
the rights of preferred stockholders was invalid or not.
The opinion fails to give any reason for this holding, merely
stating that the court believes this rule to be better than
the one suggested by the concurring opinion in the General
Investment Co. case.
Actually there was a surplus existing in the New Jersey
case, so the Yoakam opinion may be considered as merely
questioning the breadth of the principle expressed in the
concurring opinion in that case, which in terms went beyond the facts. The argument that the existence of a
corporate surplus weakens the authority of some of the
foregoing cases loses force, moreover, in view of the fact
that there was no surplus in the Morris case, the Colgate
case, or the Windhurst case; and in the Keller case the fact
that there was a surplus of over $8,000,000 was not even
mentioned in the opinion.
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co.,49 in holding that preferred stockholders were entitled to unpaid accrued dividends on dissolution, said that their right thereto matures
by lapse of time even though no profits or surplus existed.
To similar effect is the New York decision of Roberts v.
Roberts-Wicks Co.50 There, after the corporation (with
a deficit of some $90,000) reduced its capital stock, giving
to each stockholder a proportionate number of shares in
exchange for his former holdings, it succeeded in making
a profit. It was held that preferred stockholders had a
prior right to a sufficient amount of these profits to pay the
arrears of dividends on shares held by them prior to the
reduction of the stock. The Court in so holding said that
statutory authorization of reduction of capital stock did not
permit the impairing thereby of any vested right of a
shareholder nor of any corporate obligation. As to the
obligations of the corporation, the court stated:
"Its agreement to pay dividends on the preferred
stock had not been fulfilled, and, so long as the corporDel. Ch. 394, 155 A. 514 (Sup. Ct., 1931).
50 ]84 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906).
4917
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ation was a going concern, this default created an
indebtedness, which was payable whenever, in the
future, it should accumulate surplus profits from the
conduct of the business. The preferred shareholder,
as the result of the reduction of capital stock, would
hold a less number of shares; but they would still be
creditors for the arrears of dividends due by the company on the shares of preferred stock, which they had
previously held. They may not have been creditors
of the corporation, in a technical sense; but, as between
themselves and other stockholders, they were as creditors, with demands to be fully paid certain arrears
of dividends before any of the surplus profits should
be appropriated to a dividend upon the common
stock." 51 (Italics supplied.)
In this connection it is interesting to note some language
used in the past by the Maryland Court of Appeals regarding the nature of preferred stockholders' rights to accrued
dividends, though the cases did not involve the problem
here under consideration. In Heller v. Marine Bank,5
the Court was required to determine the rights in insolvency of creditors of a corporation as against those of holders of preferred stock issued pursuant to an act of 1880."8
This law was the first general law to authorize the issuance
of anything in the nature of preferred stock, authorizing
corporations, instead of issuing mortgage bonds, to issue
preferred stock under a publicly recorded agreement guaranteeing to the holders thereof a perpetual dividend of
6%, and further providing that the holders of such stock
should have all the rights of holders of capital stock, and
in addition "that the said preferred stock shall be and
constitute a lien on the franchises and property of such
corporation, and have priority over any subsequently
created mortgage, or other encumbrance".
In holding that the holders of this statutory so-called
preferred stock had a limited priority in the assets over
unsecured creditors, the Court took occasion sharply to
51184

N. Y. 257, 264-5, 77 N. E. 13, 15 (1931).

5289 Md. 602, 43 A. 800 (1899).

5 Md. Laws 1880, Ch. 474; Md. Code (1888) Art. 23, Sec. 294; repealed
by Md. Laws 1908, Ch. 240, which enacted provisions substantially similar
to those now appearing in Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 42.
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differentiate it from ordinary preferred stock. The latter
the Court considered to be merely an entrepreneur's interest in the capital far different in nature from the claims
of ordinary creditors, which had to be satisfied before any
part of the capital could be withdrawn by the entrepreneur.
It said further:
"To be strictly accurate, we ought to say, there is a
sense in which a shareholder is a creditor. In that sense
every corporation includes its capital stock amongst
its liabilities, but it is a liability which is postponed to
every other lability. And as to matured and unpaid
guaranteed dividends due on preferred stock, the relation of creditor undoubtedly exists." 54
The last sentence has been interpreted as referring only
to dividends already declared and set aside but not yet
paid,5 5 and this interpretation seems corroborated by a
recent decision.56 It is entirely possible, however, that the
Court will reject those dicta as inapplicable or of little
help at best in a situation where accrued dividends are
sought to be destroyed, and will proceed to analyze the
nature of the right to matured but undeclared dividends
in full detail.
Besides the weight of persuasive authority in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals cannot ignore the economic
and commercial effects before adopting a rule of destructibility of the right to accrued dividends by charter amendment. Although such a rule might at first blush tend to
encourage promoters to incorporate in Maryland because
of the ease with which refinancing could be accomplished,
the ultimate effect might very well be the reverse. Potential investors in preferred stock would be more careful
in determining which state the 'corporation in question
was organized in, because stock of those organized in Maryland would be subject to destruction by charter amendment
of any dividends which accrue in times of financial stress,
54 89 Md. 602, 611, 43 A. 800, 801 (1899) : citing Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co. v. State, 36 Md. 519 (1872), aff'd 89 U. S. (22 Wall.) 105 (1874).

5 BRUNE,

MARYLAND CORPORATION

LAW (1933)

47.

Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 174 Md. 639, 649, 197 A. 292, 296 (1938).
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whereas the stock of those organized in other states, including those where the law has not been settled, might
be better protected. In view of the opinion in some quarters favoring more preferred stock financing in the future,57
this aspect might well discourage future promotion of
Maryland corporations, with the concomitant loss of tax
revenue, etc.
Furthermore, such a construction placed upon the Maryland statute tends to make the word "cumulative" in the
preferred stock of Maryland corporations misleading to
the investing public. If dividends may be passed at any
time of financial difficulty and the accrued dividends may
then be wiped out by a simple charter amendment, cumulative preferred stock would be no better an investment
than non-cumulative, which long since became unpopular.
Assuming that a participating feature is attached to the
stock, it is no better than common stock, for dividends
depend entirely upon business success with no hope of
back payments to even out the cycle, which is the most
attractive feature of cumulative stock.
For that matter, preferred stock in a Maryland corporation would be worse than common stock, for it usually
carries less voting power, even when dividends are passed;
and the common stockholders could regulate dividend payments so that the preferred shareholders fare no better
than they. At least some consideration should be given
to the fact that long usage and construction of a number
of statutes have led the average investor to regard the
"cumulative" feature as a substantial right giving preferred stock more the nature of an investment than that
of a speculation.5"
(B) Merger, Consolidation or Sale of Assets
Elimination of accrued dividends by the device of merger
or consolidation with, or sale of assets to, another corporation under a plan whereby preferred stockholders in
the old corporation would be compelled to exchange their
7 Comment, supra, n. 29, 236 et seq.
51 See Note (1939) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 114, noting the McQuillen case.
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old shares plus accrued dividends for an approximately
equal value in similar shares without dividend arrearages
in the second corporation, stands a better chance of being
upheld by the Court of Appeals than does simple destruction by charter amendment. Of course dissenting stockholders would be entitled to appraisal and payment of
the fair value of their shares, which would no doubt include dividend arrearages, but at least such a maneuver
would eliminate most of the arrearage load, provided dissenting stockholders could not block the move entirely.
Until the 1935 amendments to the Maryland Code, no
provision was made for merger as such, but consolidation
of two corporations to form a new corporation has been
authorized since the Code of 1888.1' It would not require
any very broad stretch of the statutory provisions to hold
that they permitted what is technically described as a
merger, as well as a technical consolidation, for the distinction is really one of form only. The general language
of the Court in Roselle Park Trust Co. v. Ward Baking
Corporation° lends support to this view, merger and consolidation being there treated as historically contemporary.
Until 1908 consolidation required the assent of the holders
of only a majority of the stock entitled to vote; at that
time the law was changed"' so as to require the assent
of two-thirds of all the shares outstanding and entitled
to vote. In 1935 the consolidation laws were again
amended, 2 this time expressly to authorize merger as well
as consolidation, the formalities as to the latter undergoing
further changes not material to the present discussion.
It is not apparent that this amendment was induced by
any decisions holding that merger was not authorized
under the statutes as formerly phrased; it seems merely to
have been an effort to make the statute more explicit.
In any case, as will subsequently be pointed out,63 it is
highly probable that the Court of Appeals will hold statu" Md. Code (1888) Art. 23, Sec. 39; Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Secs. 33-37.
so 177 Md. 212, 9 A. (2d) 228.
41 Md. Laws 1908, Ch. 240, Sec. 29.
,1 Md. Laws 1935, Ch. 551.
8 Infra, circa n. 96. et seq.
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tory amendments subsequent to filing of the original charter of incorporation applicable thereto.
Sale of the assets of the principal corporation as an
entirety in exchange for stock or perhaps other securities
of a second corporation, followed by dissolution of the
former or distribution of its new assets, would accomplish
the same result as merger or consolidation if the agreement
of sale or plan of distribution of assets called for surrender of accrued dividends on old securities in exchange
for new securities without arrearages. Section 32 of Chapter 240 of the Laws of 1908 " constitutes the first statutory
authorization of the sale of assets as an entirety, approval
by vote of holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock
entitled to vote being required. Sale is also permitted
now pursuant to a charter amendment, 5 but dissenting
or non-voting stockholders are entitled to the usual appraisal unless there was a reservation in the charter of
a right to amend in such terms as would authorize an
amendment conferring power to sell the corporate assets
as an entirety; this provision was added to permit sale
without compliance with other statutory requirements, by
means of proper charter provision. Section 38 further provides that dissent of minority stockholders shall not delay
the carrying out of the sale.
Under the merger and consolidation statutes the surviving or new corporation, as the case may be, must assume the "debts and liabilities" and "obligations" of the
old corporation. 6 Although this is not required of the
vendee corporation in the case of sale of assets, it may well
be necessary to acceptance by the required two-thirds
majority stockholders of the vendor that the agreement of
sale provide for assumption of its debts and liabilities by
the vendee corporation. On this ground it might be argued
that an attempt to eliminate dividend arrearages by one
of these methods would prove abortive, for the responsibility for accrued dividends is merely transferred from the
a'Now

Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 38.
Art. 23, Sec. 39.
1 Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 35.

', Md. Code (1939)
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old corporation to the new or surviving or vendee corporation as a "debt" or "liability" or "obligation" for which the
latter is now "responsible", to use the pertinent phraseology
of the Maryland statutes. This view has been taken by a
number of courts in other jurisdictions in construing local
merger and consolidation statutes. The New York Court
of Appeals in Boardman v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co.67 held that dividends accrued on preferred
stock of the old corporation, even though never declared,
constituted a debt and obligation thereof which the corporation into which it was merged was bound to pay before
paying dividends on its own stock. This case has been
distinguished, 8 however, on the ground that the dividends
there were expressly guaranteed in the directors' resolution and the stock certificates when the stock was originally
issued, and they therefore came within the provision of
the merger agreement whereby the surviving company
agreed to assume all just "debts, guarantees,liabilities and
obligations" of the old company.
In Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co.6" it was held that rights
of preferred stockholders to accrued and undeclared dividends on the cumulative preferred stock of one of the
merging corporations were unaffected by the consolidation, and the corporation into which it was merged was
liable for such dividends under the terms of the statute
permitting consolidation provided all "debts, liabilities and
duties" of the consolidating corporation attached to the
new or consolidated corporation. The consolidation was
eventually held invalid,7 0 however, on other grounds; so
the authority of the Vice Chancellor's opinion may be open
to question. In Geiger v. American Seeding Machine Co.,7I
the Supreme Court of Ohio, in modifying an injunction
against a proposed distribution of assets of an Ohio corporation following a sale of its former assets, decreed that
N. Y. 157 (1881).
81 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940).
6973 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 A. 657 (Ct. of Chancery, 1907).
10Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 72 A. 126 (Ct. of Errors
and Appeals, 1909).
71 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N. E. 594 (1931), noted (1932) 17 Corn. L. Q.
269.
07 84
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the preferred stockholders were entitled to hold in preference to the common stockholders to the extent of the par
value of their shares plus accrued dividends, all the common stock of the vendee corporation received by the Ohio
corporation in exchange for its former assets. In that case,
however, the agreement of sale failed to include provisions as to distribution of the proceeds thereof; hence the
preferred stockholders were not precluded by their consent to the sale from later challenging the distribution of
the proceeds. The opinion further intimated that had such
provisions been included and the proposed sale been approved by the requisite majority, dissenting shareholders
would only have been entitled to the remedy of appraisal;
so the arrearage load would have been at least greatly
diminished, which is the maximum that can be accomplished by any of these devices, assuming that the accrued
dividends will be included in appraising the fair value
of dissenters' shares.
It is therefore evident that the argument that accrued
dividends survive the merger, consolidation or sale of
assets, as a liability of the second corporation, finds but
unconvincing authority in the most unequivocally worded
decisions. Furthermore, although the statutes in those
cases may be similar to the Maryland statutes in phraseology and intent, fundamentally the question is not so
much one of statutory or contract interpretation as one of
the view the particular court takes as to nature of the
right to accrued dividends. It is to be noted that under
the Maryland merger and consolidation statute the responsibility of the new corporation for the liabilities and obligations of the old corporation is to be the same as if it
had originally incurred those liabilities and obligations itself: no greater, no lesser. 2 A recent decision of the Court
of Appeals, while not dealing with the merger statute, has
specifically held that accrued preferred stock dividends
73
do not constitute a debt. In Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Co.
the Court was called upon to apportion various dividends
72
73

Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 35 (2) (d).
174 Md. 639, 197 A. 292 (1938).
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on stocks held in trust between corpus and income, and
74
it remarked in passing that:
"there is no relation of debtor and creditor between
the corporation and preferred stockholders or cumulative preferred stockholders until the declaration of the
dividend, when, in consequence of the declaration, the
obligation of debtor and creditor does arise."75
It would not seem at all inconsistent for the Court to consider accrued dividends as something in the nature of a
vested right, invulnerable to destruction by charter amendment, and yet not go so far as to call them a "debt", "liability" or "obligation" in the very technical sense evidently
intended in the merger and consolidation statute or as
would be intended in the ordinary contract of purchase
and sale.
The facts that a merger or consolidation or sale of assets
approved by the requisite proportion of stockholders would
be valid as such, and that accrued dividends on stock of
the old corporation would not normally be held to survive
against the new corporation, do not dispose of the entire
problem, however. There is yet to be considered the possibility that the Court of Appeals would refuse on general
equitable principles to sustain the employment of such
devices for the primary purpose of eliminating dividend
arrearages. Reduced to its simplest terms it is a question
of the extent of the powers of a majority in vote of the
stockholders to bind the minority. In American General
Corp. v. Camp,76 a case involving the fairness of the commissioners' appraisal of dissenting preferred stockholders'
shares under the consolidation statute, it was said:
"The power of a dissenting stockholder to prevent
the sale of all the assets or the consolidation or merger
of its corporate existence with another corporation frequently proved in the past a disadvantage to the other
stockholders. To overcome this difficulty and to meet
a general demand and at the same time to protect
71 174 Md. 639, 649, 197 A. 292, 296 (1938).
75 For a clear discussion of this rule see American Steel Foundries v.

Lazear, 204 F. 204 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1913).
70 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937) ; noted (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 338.

19411

ACCRUED DIVIDENDS

the dissentient in his property rights to their full extent, the General Assembly of Maryland passed appropriate legislation. So, by compliance with prescribed
conditions and procedure, any one or more corporations of this state may be consolidated with another
corporation of this or another state to form a new
corporation or be merged into another such corporation, provided, inter alia, that the consolidation or
merger shall be approved by the requisite vote of twothirds of all the shares entitled to vote.""
The Court went on to quote from Homer v. Crown Cork
and Seal Co.,78 indicating a similar state of the law with
respect to sale of assets. In that case the Court had refused
an injunction to restrain the calling of a meeting of stockholders to vote on, and the carrying out of, a sale of all the
assets of the defendant corporation, on the ground that
there was no sufficient evidence of fraud to warrant judicial interference. In so doing the Court was merely reaffirming the doctrine, built up in Maryland in such cases
as Shaw v. Davis'9 and Matthews v. Headley Chocolate
Co.,." to the effect that in the absence of fraud, illegality,
ultra vires or gross negligence, a court of equity will not
substitute its judgment as to the propriety of a proposed
corporate act for the judgment of those in control of the
corporation.8 ' Nothing in the two later opinions, however,
indicates any intention of the Court, because of the breadth
of the statutes, to relinquish its right to interfere with
proposed mergers, consolidations or sales of assets, where
such action is warranted by fraud, illegality or the like.
Indeed it seems quite generally recognized that the broad
terms of such statutes are subject to judicial limitation,
the general theory being that in fairness and justice ma" 171 Md. 629, 634, 190 A. 225, 227 (1937).
78 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928).
79 78 Md. 308, 28 A. 619 (1894), recognizing the right of majority stockholders to carry out a lease of the road of another railroad organized
expressly for the purpose.
0130 Md. 523, 100 A. 645 (1917), recognizing that minority stockholders
had a valid cause of action to recover excessive salaries voted by the
majority stockholders to themselves as officers of the corporation.
81 See McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 647
(1939).
See also Williams v. Salisbury Ice Co., 176 Md. 13, 3 A. (2d) 507;
and Williams v. Messick. 177 Md. 605, 11 A. (2d) 472 (1940).
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jority stockholders cannot be allowed to run roughshod
over impotent minorities."2
The question is therefore reduced to one of whether
destruction of preferred stockholders' rights to accrued
dividends presents a case for equitable limitation of the
right of a majority to merge, consolidate or sell all the
assets of the corporation. Although dividend arrearages
were involved in the consolidation in American General
Corp..v. Camp,s3 the question of the validity of their attempted destruction was not before the Court, for the
aggrieved stockholders were merely seeking an appraisal
of the value of their shares and had sought no other legal
or equitable relief against the consolidation. The decision
will therefore afford but little assistance when the Court
is faced with the petition of a preferred stockholder who
is being forced to sell out his interest in the enterprise on
pain of sacrificing his accrued dividends in a merger, consolidation or sale of assets.
Several courts confronted with the problem have ruled
adversely to the stockholder. In Geiger v. American Seeding Machine Co., 4 the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the
remedy afforded under the appraisal statutes is the exclusive remedy of minority stockholders; and that if they
fail to act within the prescribed time, the dissenters may
be compelled to take the new securities under a fair plan
of distribution.
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Federal United Corp.
v. Havender,s5 approved a merger plan whereby each old
share of $6 preferred stock with its accumulated dividends
of $28.50 was to be exchanged for 1 share of $3 preferred
stock and 6 shares of Class A common stock of the new
82 See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment
(1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 420, 425; Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Steckholders under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233; Lattin Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority
Stockholders (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 645; Comment (1937) 35 Mich. L.
Rev. 626; Note (1932) 17 Corn. L. Q. 269; Note (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 908.
83171 Md. 629, 190 A- 225 (1937).
s 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N. E. 594 (1931), noted (1932) 17 Corn. L. Q.
269.
1 11 A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1940) ; rev'g Havender v. Federal United
Corp., 2 A. (2d) 143 (Del. Ct. of Chancery, 1938), 6 A. (2d) 618 (Del. Ct.
of Chancery, 1939).
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corporation. The Chancellor had held the merger void
and enjoined the payment of dividends on the new $3
preferred stock until all the accrued dividends on preferred shares of the old corporation held by the dissenting
stockholders had been paid. He reasoned that the merger
statutes (including provision for appraisal), even though
they required a filed statement as to capital adjustments
incident to the proposed merger, did not contemplate or
permit a merger proposed solely as a cloak for recapitalization involving destruction of accrued dividends; an act
which would be illegal under the rule of Keller v. Wilson 86
if attempted by amendment was not made legal by employment of the device of merger instead. On appeal the
Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor and ordered the
bill of complaint dismissed. It was ruled that since the
law with regard to merger and consolidation had been in
the statutes, and therefore written into all corporate charters, all along, the stockholder had advance notice that his
rights, including those to accrued dividends, were defeasible in that they might be altered at any time by merger
in accordance with the law. The Court dismissed the
argument that the accrued dividends were a "debt or liability" which must, under the statute, be assumed by the
surviving corporation, on the ground that the statute was
clearly intended to, and did, deal only with the rights of
outsiders as against the merging corporation, and not with
the rights of stockholders inter sese or between the stockholders and the corporation. Keller v. Wilson was distinguished on the ground that the corporate charter there
antedated the statutory amendment permitting alteration
or destruction of accrued dividends, and the state's reserved power with respect to corporate charters could not
be exercised to the detriment of rights vested under the
old law. Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson87 was
held inapplicable as involving the charter amendment statutes, whereas only the merger statutes were involved in
the case at bar. After distinguishing other decisions and
190 A. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1936).
194 A. 844 (Del. Ct. of Chancery, 1937) ; 197 A. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct.,
1937).
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asserting that the existence of the alternative of appraisal
which the stockholder might have elected made the alteration of his rights by merger fair, the Court concluded that
in any case the complainant was barred from seeking relief
by his laches. It seems reasonable to suppose, however,
that although the laches was sufficient alone to warrant
the ruling, the Court deliberately set forth its views as
to the law it would apply in the future.
The same may be said of the decision of the New Jersey
Court of Errors and Appeals in Windhurst v. Central
Leather Co.,18 upholding both decrees of the Vice-Chancellor, one denying injunctive relief because of laches and
the other refusing specific performance of the preferred
stock contract as to rights in dissolution. The Court
adopted the view expressed by the lower tribunal that the
merger plan, calling for the surrender of old preferred
stock with its accrued dividends in exchange for cash and
stock in the new corporation, was fair and just to all
parties involved and was not inequitable to preferred
shareholders.
The existence of the statutory right of dissenting stockholders to demand appraisal and payment in cash of the
fair value of their interests argues strongly against the
imposition of any further limitations on the power of the
majority to merge, consolidate or sell all the assets of the
corporation. As pointed out in American General Corp.
v. Camp,"9 the Legislature imposed the statutory condition
on the power of the majority for the express purpose of
protecting dissenters. This may reasonably be said to
indicate a legislative intent that appraisal was to be the
exclusive remedy of stockholders who do not wish to join
the reorganization and accept an investment in a new corporation in lieu of their old interests. One court has already adopted just this view.9
6s 107 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 A. 402 (Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1931) ; aff'g
101 N. J. Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (Ct. of Chancery, 1927), 105 N. J. Eq. 621,
149 A. 36 (Ct. of Chancery, 1930).
89 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937).
90 Geiger v. American Seeding Machine Co., 124 Ohio St. 222. 177 N. E.
594 (1931).
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On the other hand, it has been held in Maryland that
consolidation, at least, accomplishes a practicaldissolution
of the old corporationY' This might be considered to give
rise to the common-law consequences of dissolution purely
aside from the appraisal statutes, in which case the old
corporation would be required to make a fair distribution
of its assets to dissenting stockholders. The Pennsylvania
court has held in regard to merger that such a "practical"
dissolution of the old corporation brought into operation
the provisions in the preferred stock contract with respect
to rights upon dissolution, and that therefore the holders
thereof were entitled to accrued dividends in addition to
par value.2 In this connection it is important to note that
in American General Corp. v. Camp the Court of Appeals
in applying the appraisal statute approved an award of the
commissioners which included the amount of accrued dividends on the preferred stock of one of the absorbed corporations which had a capital surplus at the date of consolidation, but which included nothing for accrued dividends on the preferred stock of another of the absorbed
corporations which had a deficit at that date.
Similar results might well be expected were the Court
to adopt the Pennsylvania view that the "practical" dissolution of the corporation gave dissenting stockholders
common-law rights as well as their rights under the appraisal statutes. The existence of the latter, however,
would seem to eliminate entirely the necessity for according dissenters the additional remedy, as well as to justify
refusal to interfere with any merger, consolidation or sale
of assets.
11 State, use of Dodson, v. Baltimore & Lehigh 1. R., 77 Md. 489, 26 A.
865 (1893) ; State v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 104
Md. 364, 65 A. 40 (1906) ; Diggs v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50,
75 A. 517 (1910).
92 Petry v. Harwood Electric Co., 280 Pa. 142, 158, 124 A. 302, 307
(1924). Even so, there is authority for the proposition that the preferred
stockholders need not be paid in cash where the stock acquired as assets
by the old corporation already has a well-established market value, rendering it the virtual equivalent of cash. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U. S. 590, 598, 65 L. Ed. 425, 41 S. Ct. 209 (1921); American
Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923). This, however,
would not cover the situation where the new corporation is created
solely for the purpose of accomplishing this recapitalization.
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Since the Court of Appeals considered the status of the
corporation's capital account to be important after a consolidation, in American General Corp. v. Camp, there is
reason to believe that it might also consider this element
of importance before a consolidation is carried out. While
this element was not decisive of either the New Jersey or
the Delaware case discussed above,93 it affords a basis for
evaluating the true importance of the right to accrued dividends of whose threatened destruction a dissenting stockholder complains. In a case where a surplus exists, the
accrued dividends represent a real interest of the stockholders in the corporate enterprise; and the Court might
hesitate long before withholding protection of such an
interest, especially if it felt that appraisal was not an
entirely adequate remedy but that common-law rights on
dissolution could not be invoked.
On the other hand, if there is no surplus, the rights to
accrued dividends are indeed hollow, and surely mere
empty shells of now valueless rights do not merit the
serious consideration of a court faced with the problems
of a corporation seeking financial rehabilitation. Nevertheless it may well be that a rule making the existence
vel non of corporate surplus determinative of the validity
of a plan of merger, consolidation or sale of assets, would
be too arbitrary, especially in view of the indefinity of
the nature of any corporate surplus or deficit. Rather than
to attempt an analysis in each case of the surplus or deficit existing, it would be much simpler and would probably
produce more equitable results if the Court were to decide
the question in the light of all the facts presented. There
is at least one case in Maryland tending to indicate that
the Court will attach considerable importance to the business aspects of the situation in dealing with matters of
corporate financing. In Leviness v. Consolidated Gas,
Electric Light & Power Co.9 4 the corporation wished to
make an advantageous sale of certain of its real property,
98 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, supra, n. 85; Windhurst v. Central
Leather Co., 8upra, n. 88.
91 114 Md. 559, 80 A. 304 (1911).

1941]

ACCRUED DIVIDENDS

but the vendee objected to the title as being imperfect
because subject to the statutory lien of preferred stockholders thereon. This stock had been issued pursuant to
the same statute involved in Heller v. Marine Bank,9 5
which provided that the preferred stock should constitute
a lien on the franchises and property of the corporation.
There was no provision for release of this lien by the preferred stockholders, on which ground the defendant vendee
resisted the corporation's suit for specific performance.
The Court decreed a release of the lien and ordered the
vendee to pay the purchase price, on the ground that the
exigencies of the business situation warranted such a judicial release where it was to the advantage of all the parties
concerned and precautions were taken to safeguard all
interests.
CONSTRUCTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

POLICY

Up to this point the discussion has been primarily a
more or less technical analysis of the legal aspects of the
problem of funding accrued dividends. Of course no examination of this problem would be complete without an
attempt to indicate those broad lines of constructional
policy which are likely to influence the decision of the
Court of Appeals to a considerable degree. Indeed since
all the authority on the question is merely persuasive and
since strictly legal grounds may be found on which to rest
a decision either way, perhaps it will be the general approach of the Court that will ultimately determine the
conclusion.
It is highly probable that the Court of Appeals will
consider all provisions of the General Corporation Law,
including all amendments, applicable to any existing Maryland corporation regardless of the date of its incorporation.
Past decisions indicate a general judicial tendency in Maryland to give wide scope to the State's reserved power of
amendment of corporate charters, the general theory being
that this reservation in the Constitutions of 185196 and
89 Md. 602, 43 A. 800 (1899) ; supra, n. 53.
"Art. 3, Sec. 47.
'G
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186711 constitutes a condition upon which every charter
is granted, as if written into the charter itself." It has
been generally recognized, however, that this power reserved by the State is not without its constitutional and
equitable limitations. In Sprigg v. Western Telegraph
Co., 9 the Court of Appeals, in refusing to enjoin a proposed
reincorporation under the then new General Corporation
Law of a corporation originally chartered by special act,
suggested a test as to the legality of any exercise of the
state's reserved power. This test has gained wide acceptance as a result of its lucid exposition by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Looker v. Maynard.00 As
generally applied today, the test involves two aspects:
(1) as affecting the contract between the state and the
corporation or the contract between the corporation and
its stockholders, any exercise by the state of its reserved
power which results in a fundamental and material change
in the objects expressed in the charter is invalid unless
assented to unanimously by the stockholders; and (2) as
affecting the contract between the stockholders inter sese,
any exercise of the power is void if it impairs any right
vested under the charter. The test has found further
expression in Maryland in Jackson v. Walsh, 01 Webster
v. Cambridge Female Seminary 0 2 and Brown v. Maryland
Telephone & Telegraph Co.'
It is clear that any change or alteration which the Legislature might make in a corporation's charter by direct act
may be made indirectly by delegating to the corporation
or to a majority or other proportion of the stockholders
1 Art. 3, Sec. 48; also given expression in Md. Code (1939) Art. 23,
Sec. 135.
0s State v. Northern Central Ry. Co., 44 Md. 131, 165 (1875) ; Sprigg v.
Western Telegraph Co., 46 Md. 67 (1877) ; Jackson v. Walsh, 75 Md. 304,
23 A. 778 (1892); Webster v. Cambridge Female Seminary, 78 Md. 193,
28 A. 25 (1893); Phinney v. Shepard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 88 Md. 633,
42 A. 58 (1898); appeal dismissed 177 U. S. 170, 44 L. Ed. 720, 20 S. Ct.
573 (1900) ; Brown v. Maryland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 101 Md. 574,
61 A. 338 (1905).
99 46 Md. 67 (1877).
100 170 U. S. 46, 52, 45 L. Ed. 79, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900).
10175 Md. 304, 23 A. 778. (1892).
10378 Md. 193, 28 A. 25 (1893).
108 101 Md. 574, 61 A. 338 (1905).
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permissive power to do so.1" 4 Hence action taken by a
majority or other designated proportion of stockholders
under authority conferred by statute subsequent to the
date of incorporation stands on the same footing as such
action would if effected directly by the state. The problem therefore becomes one of whether statutory authorization of action by a majority or other proportion of stockholders resulting in destruction of the preferred stockholders' right to accrued dividends, constitutes such a fundamental and material change in, or so impairs rights
vested under, existing charters that it is invalid. There
being little if anything of assistance on the precise issue
in the Maryland case and statute law, the Court of Appeals
will again have to resort to legal writings and persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions, weighing the merits
of one view as against the other.
Opinion seems to be general among text-writers and
commentators, who have written much on the subject, 1 5
that destruction of accrued dividends is destruction of a
vested right, and therefore any legislative enactment
which, in the exercise of the state's reserved power, authorizes less than all the stockholders to take such action
by charter amendment or otherwise, impairs an obligation
of the threefold contract between state, corporation and
stockholders. If not unconstitutional on such grounds, at
least the legislation tends to interfere with the relations of
the stockholders inter sese, and it should not be construed
so to apply. A number of courts have held outright that
statutes subsequent to the date of incorporation would be
104 See Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249
App. Div. 181, 184, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, 936 (Second Dept. 1936); aff'd
memo., 273 N. Y. 593, 7 N. E. (2d) 708 (1937).
105 BRUNE, Op. Cit. supra, n. 55, 76-87; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 5447; Cades, Constitutional and Equitable Limitations on the Power of the Majority to Amend Charters so as to Affect
Shareholders' Interests in the Corporation (1928) 77 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 256;
Curran, Minority Stockholders and Amendment of Corporate Charters
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 743; Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 585, 723; Stern,
The Limitations of the Power of the State Under a Reserved Right to
Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation (1905) 53 Univ. Pa. L. Rev.
73; Comment (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1163; Comment (1937) 23 Va. L.
Rev. 579; Note (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 859.
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unconstitutional if interpreted to permit majority stockholders by charter amendment to destroy the rights of
preferred stockholders to dividend arrearages. 100 If the
Court of Appeals adopts this view, it seems reasonably
certain that as to corporations chartered before June 1,
1916, majority stockholders would be held unable to alter
or destroy accrued dividends by the device of charter
amendment; for the earlier statutes strictly limited the
legitimate purposes of charter amendment 0 7 and contained no provision which could be construed broadly enough
to authorize an amendment of that sort, such as the
present provision permitting "any other amendment of
the charter that may be desired", which became law on
the date mentioned above.0 ' It might be argued that, even
as to dissenting stockholders who acquired their stock
prior to that date, rights to dividends which accumulated
thereafter did not become "vested" under the old law but
arose subject to powers granted to majority stockholders
by the new law. Such an argument, however, ignores the
fact that the rights "vested" in accordance with, and by
virtue of, the terms of a contract entered into under the
old law and whose obligations cannot be impaired by subsequent law.
On the other hand courts have gone far as to what rights
they have considered alterable by majority stockholders
under legislative authority conferred subsequent to the
date of incorporation. For example, charter amendments
so authorized have been upheld which actually destroyed
1°6Keller v. Wilson, 190 A. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1936); Patterson v.
Durham Hosiery Mills Co., 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906 (1939) ; Harbine
v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N. . (2d) 281 (Ct. App.
Montgomery Co., 1939).
any
(1888) Art. 23, Sec. 47, provided merely that "...
10'Md. Code
alteration or amendment . . . made by the authority of the corporation"
should be acknowledged and recorded in the same manner as an original
certificate, and should then become a part of the charter. Sections 73 to
78 permitted increase or diminution of the capital stock by the vote of the
holders of at least two-thirds of all the shares. These provisions underwent no substantial change until 1908, when all the amendment sections
were collected into Md. Code (1912) Art. 23, Sec. 24, and added permission
was granted to a majority in vote to change the corporate name, principal
place of business and a few other matters not material here.
1' Md. Laws 1916, Ch. 596. See. 8. At the same time the proportion
of stockholders required for amendment was raised to two-thirds in vote
of each class.
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accrued dividends (a doubtful precedent, however)

,109

or

altered relative preferences of different classes of stock, 110
or made non-assessable stock assessable,"' or authorized
(by a two-thirds vote where unanimous approval was previously required) the issuance of a preferred class of
stock. 1 2 Similarly a Federal court"8 construing New Jersey law sustained a merger although the elimination of
par value on the complainant's shares accomplished
thereby was authorized only by a post-incorporation statute, and this was in a strong case where dissenting preferred stockholders were also deprived of voting and pre-4
emption rights. The Supreme Court of the United States"
has held an Ohio corporation bound by a post-incorporation
appraisal statute requiring the corporation to pay the value
demanded by dissenters for their shares if the corporation
fails to make an offer to them.
The Maryland Court's decision in Public Service Com5
mission v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co."
has been interpreted as upholding a charter amendment
reducing par value stock to no-par stock under post-incorporation legislative authority." 6 While the amendment
there involved was in fact upheld, the Court did not even
consider the question of the state's reserved power, the
chief point at issue being whether such a charter amendment had to be approved by the Public Service Commission under the terms of the statute regulating public utilities. The result of the case might, however, taken in conjunction with the Maryland cases previously cited," 7 be
said to indicate a general tendency of the Court of Appeals
.0Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. i.,
1929), a Federal decision construing Delaware law before Keller v. Wilson.
110 Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654
(Ct. of Chancery, 1928).
" Somerville v. St. Louis Mining and Mill. Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac.
464 (1912) ; contra, Garey v. St. Joe. Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369
(1907).
Ill Hinckley v. Schwartzchild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95
N. Y. Supp. 357 (First Dept., 1905).
1.. Clarke v. Gold Dust Corporation, 106 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
"" Voeller v. Nellston Warehouse Co., 311 U. S. -, 85 L. Ed. 314, 61 Sup.
Ct. 376 (1941).
118148 Md. 90, 129 A. 22 (1925).
1Curran, Minority Stockholders and The Amendment of Corporate
Charters (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 743, 770.
"7 Supra, n. 98.
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to give relatively wide scope and applicability to the state's
reserved power of amendment.
The liberality with which the applicable provisions of
the Maryland statutes, as amended, will be construed presents a distinct and rather difficult question. This is due
not only to the fact that there are no Maryland cases sufficiently in point, but also to the numerous dynamic factors
which enter into every decision, including the varying
experience and outlook of the judges, their estimate as to
the probable economic effect of holding one way or the
other, and the peculiar facts of the particular case, to mention only a few. The only Maryland cases which throw
any light on the situation, and that but dim and diffused
at most, are two involving railroads whose corporate existence was challenged on purely formal grounds when they
sought to condemn land for rights of way. In Piedmont
& Cumberland Ry. Co. v. Speelman it was said: "Is
"The general railroad law of this state is a remedial
statute, and is therefore to be construed liberally.
Good faith and reasonable certainty is all that is required. In passing that law, the Legislature distinctly
recognized the benefit of railroads to the community,
and did away with the old cumbersome and expensive mode of obtaining, by legislative action [i. e.,
special act of incorporation], the right to build them.
It was the manifest object of that law to enlarge and
not to restrict the construction of railroads." (Insert
supplied.)
This language, which was quoted with approval a quartercentury later in Hyattsville v. Washington, Westminster
& Gettysburg R. R.,119 would be just as valid if the word
"corporation", meaning ordinary commercial corporation,
were substituted for the word "railroad". This is especially
true in view of the fact that the general railroad law referred to comprises Sections 197 to 274 of Article 23 of the
present Maryland Code, which is the General Corporation
Law.
118 67 Md. 260, 272, 10 A. 77. 79

(1887).
129 120 Md. 128, 16. 87 A. 828. S31 (1913).
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It does not seem unreasonable to argue that there is just
as much public policy favoring the development of ordinary
commercial corporations in a jurisdiction wherein is located the second most important seaport in the United
States, as there was in favor of development of railroads.
A commercially-minded Court certainly would not hesitate to give the General Corporation Law such liberal construction as public interest required in the particular case.
Where a corporation is in financial straits it is clearly to
the general public's benefit that it should be able to rehabilitate itself by a fair recapitalization plan rather than that
minority preferred stockholders should be permitted to
block any reasonable attempts at refinancing. Care must
be taken, however, not to look on every suit by a minority
stockholder as a mere "strike" suit unworthy of judicial
consideration. 20
CONCLUSION

There is no inconsistency of result if the Court of Appeals
declines to follow the lead of the McQuillen case, and holds
that funding of accrued dividends may not legally be
accomplished by charter amendment but may be accomplished by means of a merger, consolidation or sale of
assets. Destruction of his right to accrued dividends alters
considerably the contract the preferred stockholder originally made. Hence the Court would be justified in protecting him against forcible deprivation of this right by
charter amendment which offers him no compensation for
the lost right other than an unasked-for larger investment
in the enterprise; and it should make no difference whether
the amendment expressly eliminates dividend arrearages
or is of the so-called "voluntary" or "optional" type creating a prior preferred stock but leaving the old shareholder
no real economic choice but to surrender his rights, on the
terms of exchange proposed. On the other hand, the stockholder needs no judicial protection against loss of this
right resulting from a merger, consolidation or sale of
120 See Berback, Stockholders' SWits:
Mich. L. Rev. 597, 604 et seq.

A Possible Substitute (1937)

35
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assets, for the statutes have provided adequate protection
by affording him the opportunity of demanding that he
be bought out at a fair value. The existence of this real
alternative disposes of any contention that to allow funding
of accrued dividends by merger, consolidation or sale of
assets is to allow the accomplishment by one device of
an end which would be illegal if sought to be gained by
another means, charter amendment. It is primarily a question of weighing the exigencies of the business situation
against the equities of minority stockholders in attempting
to reach a fair result.

